Date:  24 May 2010

Breaking the chain of causation

Spencer v Wincanton Holdings [2009]

Where the claimant has already suffered personal injury and is then involved in an accident, as a result of his own risky behaviour, will this be sufficient to break the chain of causation?

The claimant suffered a minor injury to his knee in an accident at work in 2000 and, rather unusually, the injury resulted in the amputation of the claimant’s leg (up to and including his knee) in early 2003. The defendant admitted liability for the accident and the subsequent amputation.

The claimant was determined to rehabilitate himself and despite the defendant’s insurers paying for the rehabilitation process, a settlement had still not been agreed when in October 2003 the claimant had another accident.  He was filling up his car with petrol but the car had not been modified to accommodate the prosthesis. In trying to return to the driver’s door the claimant tripped and fell; he was using neither his prosthesis nor his sticks at the time.

The further injury suffered left the claimant permanently in a wheelchair.

The defendant refused to accept liability for the further injury and argued the chain of causation had been broken by the claimant’s conduct i.e. failure to use his either his prosthesis or his sticks.

First Instance

The court held the defendants were liable for the effects of the second accident. The defendant was responsible for the first accident which caused the loss of his leg and this was a primary cause of the events surrounding the second accident. The claim was subject to a reduction of 1/3rd in damages to reflect the claimant’s own negligence in not seeing the trip hazard and not using his sticks.

Court of Appeal

The defendant appealed on the basis that the claimant’s conduct was unreasonable, amounted to a novus actus intervenien; and that what followed was not a natural and probable consequence of the original accident. Their appeal was rejected.

The test to be applied regarding a break in the chain of causation centres around ‘fairness’. Like the amputation, the fall was “an unexpected but real consequence of the original accident”. In order to satisfy the court that the chain had been broken the onus is on the defendant to show that “further injury … has been in substance brought about by the claimant and not the tortfeasor.” It was held that the claimant’s unreasonable conduct had been adequately reflected in the original finding of contributory negligence.

Conclusion

The case is in line with the approach taken by the House of Lords in Corr v IBC Vehicles [2008] where it was held that suicide (resulting from a depressive illness caused the defendant’s wrongdoing) was not considered sufficient to break the chain. The courts are clearly reluctant to deny a claimant further compensation unless there is a very striking degree of culpability on the part of the claimant for the subsequent accident.  It will be interesting to see if in future cases, the defendants attempt to persuade the courts to take a different view.